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Commencement of Statute of Limitations
For Malpractice of an Attorney
James Gordon Joseph'
N 1953 A MOTHER AND HER SON employed an attorney to prepare a
last will and testament for the mother. The will included a devise
of specific real property to the son. The attorney negligently re-
quested the son to be one of the two attesting witnesses and the son
did so. The mother died in 1959, almost seven years after the execu-
tion of the will. Only after the will was filed for probate did the
son discover that the devise to him was invalid.'
On March 28, 1962, an attorney advised his clients that they could
lawfully realize a profit upon the resale of property to a corporation
promoted by them. He also advised the clients that they need not
disclose to the other stockholders that they planned to make the
profit. Acting on the attorney's advice, the clients resold the land to
the corporation. In January of 1964 certain shareholders brought a
derivative action to recover the clients' secret profits. On August
24, 1964, the clients cross-complained against the attorney, alleging
his malpractice and seeking indemnity for $104,800, the amount of
their liability.2
In each of the above cases a statute of limitations for attorney
malpractice barred the client's claim.
In almost all jurisdictions the statute of limitations for the mal-
practice of an attorney is between one and three years. Although
some argue that this is too short a period, the main problem is not
in the statute but in its application. Difficulty arises when a court
must decide at what point the statute of limitations begins to run. To
appreciate a court's problem, the nature and reasons behind statutes
of limitations must be understood.
Statutes of limitations are designed to prevent undue delay in
bringing suits, so that neither party will gain advantage nor be dis-
advantaged by the passage of time.3 Such statutes give a defendant
a fair chance to investigate a claim and prepare a defense while the
facts and evidence are still fresh.4 Statutes of limitations are founded
on the theory that valid claims are usually not allowed to rest for very
long.5 Thus, by compelling action within a reasonable time,6 the
*B.A., Ohio State University; Second-year student, Cleveland State University College
of Law.
I Goldberg v. Bosworth, 29 Misc.2d 1057, 215 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
2 Eckert v. Schaal, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967).
B Vason v. Nickley, 438 F.2d 24-2 (6th Cir. 1971).
Mosby v. Reese Hospital, 49 Il1. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964) ; Hackworth v.
Ralston Purina Co., 214 Tenn. 506, 381 S.W.2d 292 (1964).
B Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs., 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873).
6 Law's Adm'r. v. Culver, 121 Vt. 285, 155 A.2d 855 (1959).
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statute aims to prevent fraudulent and stale claims7 and operates
against those who neglect their rights.8
Commencement Rules
Several rules of law have emerged throughout the various juris-
dictions as to when the statute of limitations for the attorney mal-
practice begins to run.
First, in the absence of fraudulent concealment or misrepresenta-
tion by an attorney of his negligence, the statute begins to run at the
time of the attorney's negligent act.9 Second, regardless of fraudulent
concealment or misrepresentation by an attorney, the statute begins
to run at the time of the negligent act. 10 Third, the statute begins
to run, not at the time of the attorney's negligent act, but when the
client incurs some damage."' Fourth, the statute does not begin to
run until the termination of the attorney-client relationship.12 Fifth,
where the malpractice involves a delay or non-feasence by the attor-
ney, the statute does not begin to run until the delay results in some
damage to the client. 13 Sixth, where an attorney's malpractice results
in the statute of limitations barring a client's cause of action, the
statute of limitations for the attorney's malpractice does not begin
to run until the client's cause of action becomes barred 14 or until the
attorney has had a reasonable time to act on the client's claim.15
The majority rule, which appears to be losing favor, is that the
statute of limitations for legal malpractice, in the absence of fraud
or concealment (and in some jurisdictions regardless of fraud or
concealment), begins to run at the time of the attorney's negligent
act.61 The rationale for this rule is weak.
In a California case recognizing the rule, the court reasoned
that if the "time honored rule" seemed harsh, it should be changed
by the legislature with appropriate conditions that would still limit
the time that an attorney may be held liable. 17
In the previously described New York case' 8 concerning the in-
valid devise, the court tenuously reasoned that at the time of the at-
torney's negligent act, damage, although nominal, was sustained and
7 Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957).
Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1962).
Ft. Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
In Troll v. Glantz, 57 Misc.2d 572, 293 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
11 Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So.2d 372 (La. App. 1963).
12 Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1955).
13 Jensen v. Sprigg, 84 Cal. App. 519, 258 P.683 (1927).
14 Bernard v. Walkup, 272 Cal. App.2d 595, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969) ; Shelly v. Hansen,
244 Cal. App.2d 210, 53 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1966).
11 Buchanan v. Hudson, 39 Ga. App. 734, 148 S.E. 345 (1929) ; Rhine's Admrs. v.
Evans, 66 Pa. 192 (1870).
10 Ft. Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
Troll v. Glantz, 57 Misc.2d 572, 293 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
17 Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 Cal. App.2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1963).




the attorney could have been sued when the will was wrongfully at-
tested. The damage-"the cost ... of having a new will prepared and
executed."' 9 How could the mother or son reasonably have been ex-
pected to ascertain the invalidity of the devise before the will was
probated? In a situation such as this, it cannot be said that the evi-
dence is not fresh. The negligently attested will is clear and convincing
evidence. And it cannot be said that the son neglected his right. As a
layman, he was in no position to realize the consequences of his at-
testation. This rule seems to favor a wrongdoer over a duly diligent
client.
A minority rule that offers some relief to clients as well as pro-
tecting attorneys is that the statute of limitations for the malpractice
of an attorney begins to run not at the time of the attorney's negli-
gent act, but when the client incurs damage.2 0 In a Louisiana case2 '
the plaintiff engaged the defendant attorney to assert her rights to
her paternal grandmother's will and also to her father's will. When
she became unhappy with the way the suits were progressing, she
released the attorney and obtained different counsel to continue the
suits. While the suits were still pending, she sued the first attorney for
malpractice in conducting the litigation. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's judgment of prematurity but assured the plaintiff that
her action for damages would not be barred by the statute of limita-
tions if her causes of action upon the wills were lost as a result of
the first attorney's negligence. This rule not only protects an attor-
ney from a premature lawsuit but also gives him an opportunity to
correct his negligent mistakes where possible, or as in this instance,
have someone else correct them.
Although California follows the rule that the statute of limitations
runs from the time of the negligent act, one case held that for a cause
of action to be complete, the client must suffer a loss or injury as
the proximate result of the attorney's negligence. Therefore the
statute of limitations begins to run against the cause of action only
when the action is complete. 2 '
Reasoning that it is illogical to distinguish between malpractice
suits and other negligence actions, a District of Columbia court de-
cided the statute of limitations in a malpractice suit should begin
to run when the client suffers an injury.2" There an attorney advised
the plaintiff on May 16, 1962, that it could lawfully send its boats
to fish in Venezuelan waters. The attorney had negligently misin-
terpreted the law and the boats were impounded on July 25, 1962.
The plaintiff commenced his malpractice suit against the attorney
19 Id.
20 Ft. Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So.2d 372 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
21 Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So. 372 (La. App. 1961).
22 Eckert v. Schaal, 251 Cal. App.2d 379, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967).
23 Ft. Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. V. Steptoc & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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on July 22, 1965. Since the injury was suffered on July 25, 1962, the
action- was timely brought within the three year: statutory period.
A frequent argument made in behalf of a client is thai the statute
does not begin to run until the termination of the attorney-client
relationship.24 Although almost all of the earlier cases rejected this
contention, some recent cases have adopted it.
In the 1971 Ohio case Keaton Co. v. Kolby,26 the defendant attorney
was employed by the plaintiff in January, 1966. A lease was executed
on behalf of the plaintiff in May, 1966. The attorney negligently failed
to exercise the plaintiff's options to renew in February, 1968. In
August, 1969, plaintiff filed his petition against the attorney for mal-
practice. The court noted the Ohio rule that a cause of action for
medical malpractice accrues, at the latest, when the physician-patient
relationship terminates. The reason for this rule, the court said, is
that it strengthens the relationship. The patient may rely on the
physician's ability during the relationship, and the physician has the
opportunity to give full treatment and also to immediately correct
any errors of judgment on his part. Reasoning that there should be
no distinction between malpractice of physicians and attorneys and
that justification for the rule as to physicians applies with equal force
to attorneys, the court held that in an action against an attorney for
malpractice, the statute of limitations begins to run, at the latest,
when the attorney-client relationship terminates. The statute of
limitations in Ohio is one year.
Keaton adopted the rule of McW/ililams v. Hackett26 and reversed
the frequently relied upon decision in Ohio of Galloway v. Hood,27
which held that the statute begins to run at the time of the attorney's
negligent act. In Galloway an attorney was sued for failing to timely
file the plaintiff's claim for workmen's compensation. There the Court
of Appeals had reasoned that " . . . harsh as the law may be in its
application to the individual, the contention of the plaintiff [that the
statute does not begin to run until the attorney-client relationship
had terminated] cannot be sustained for it is not the law to be applied
in cases for malpractice of attorneys, though it is generally the rule
applied in cases arising between patient and physician or surgeon."
Whether the attorney's negligent act constitutes misfeasance or
non-feasance has affected courts' rulings as to the commencement of
the statute of limitations. One view is that the statute does not begin
to run until the delay or nonfeasance causes an injury to the client.
In Jensen v. Sprigg28 an attorney delayed the bringing of a suit against
a defendant who owed his client money until after the defendant was
24 Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1955).
2 27 Ohio St.2d 234, 271 N.E.2d 772 (1971).
26 McWilliams v. Hackett, 19 Ohio App. 416 (1923).
27 Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941).
28 Jensen v. Sprigg, 84- Cal. App. 519, 258 P;683 (1927).
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adjudged a bankrupt. The court held that it was at that point that the
attorney's negligence occurred and the statute of limitations began
to run.
A frequent problem involving the delay or non-feasance by an
attorney occurs when the client's cause of action becomes barred by
the statute of limitations as a result of the attorney's inaction. One
view is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
client's cause of action becomes barred.29 In the leading Pennsyl-
vania case of Moore v. Juvenal,3 0 the court's rationale for this view was
that the attorney's negligence began when his client directed him to
bring an action on his claim and the attorney failed to do so. The
negligence then became complete when the statute of limitations had
run upon that action.
Another view is that where an attorney's inaction causes his
client's claim to become barred by the statute of limitations, the
statute of limitations against the attorney for malpractice begins to
run as soon as the attorney has had a reasonable time to act upon
the claim but failed to do so.31 The rationale for this rule is based upon
breach of contract rather than negligence. 32 An attorney violates his
contract of employment when he does not act upon his client's claim
within a reasonable time.33
Fraudulent Concealment of Negligence
There is a necessary exception to the majority rule. that the
statute of limitations for the malpractice of an attorney begins to
run at the time of the negligent act. Where a client does not or cannot
reasonably realize that he has a cause of action against his attorney
for malpractice because the attorney misrepresents or fraudulently
conceals his negligence, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the client discovers the attorney's negligence.3 4
This exception gained support in a recent California appellate
decision.3 5 The court reasoned that the relationship between an attor-
ney and client is one of trust and confidence. Where such a relation-
ship exists, any concealment of a material fact constitutes fraud. A
client cannot be expected to hire a second attorney to keep watch on
the first attorney and so on ad infinitum.
There are two requisites to the application of the rule that the
fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation by an attorney of his
29 Bernard v. Walkup, 272 Cal App.2d 595, 77 Cal. Rptr., 544 (1969) ; Shelly v. Hansen,
244 Cal. App.2d 210, 53 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1966).
80 Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. 484 (1830).
s' Buchanan v. Hudson, 39 Ga. App. 734, 148 S.E. 345 (1929); Rhine's Adm'rs. v. Evans,
66 Pa. 192 (1870).
s McArthur v. Baker, 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 440 (1885).
a3 Id.
84 Fortune v. English, 226 Il1. 262, 80 N.E. 781 (1907).
3 Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 14 Cal. App.3d 813, 92 Cal. Rptr.
314 (1971).
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negligence extends the statute of limitations. First, the fraud must
be a substantive part of the cause of action and not incidental to it.36
But this can reach unfair results and protect an intentional wrong-
doer. In a leading Kansas case,37 a client gave his attorney a note
for collection. The attorney told his client that the debtor could no
longer be found. The attorney concealed the fact that before receiving
the note for collection, he, the attorney, had agreed with the debtor
to pay the note as a downpayment for the debtor's house. Because
of this, the attorney never attempted to collect the note. By the time
the client discovered the fraud, the two-year statute of limitations
for legal malpractice had run. The court held that because the fraud
was not related to the contract to collect the note but merely incident-
al to the cause of action, it did not extend the statutory period.
The second requisite is that if the client could have discovered
the attorney's fraud in the exercise of reasonable care and did not,
he is precluded from recovery." A typical example is that an attor-
ney delays in bringing suit and attachment proceedings against his
client's debtor. By the time the attorney finally commences the suit,
other creditors have secured liens on the property sought to be
attached and the attorney conceals his lack of diligence. The client
is precluded from recovery because such information is a matter
of public record and is charged in law to be within his knowledge.39
Another common situation is that in which an attorney obtains
a judgment on his client's claim but fails to issue execution upon it,
although the judgment could have been collected. Over a period of
years the attorney represents to the client that the judgment will be
collected. The rule is that the client is not justified in waiting such
a long period of time before investigating the matter.40
Other jurisdictions take the view that the fraudulent concealment
by an attorney of his negligence does not toll the statute of limita-
tions.41 These jurisdictions hold that the statute begins to run at the
time of the negligent act. However, the reasoning for this rule is
weak. In one New York case, 42 the attorney's negligence and his
fraudulent concealment of it were obvious, but the court quickly
disposed of the issue of fraud simply stating "nor did the concealment
of the facts toll the statute." There was a dissenting opinion in the
case which stated that the reasons for the attorney's dismissal were
"without merit." Another New York case reasoned that the fraud-
ulent concealment by an attorney of his negligence does not extend
36 Cornell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 P.602 (1914).
37 Stinson v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 54 Kan. 537, 38 P.788 (1895).
38 Wilmot v. Moody, 47 Cal. App. 156, 190 P.639 (1920).
39 Wheaton v. Nolan, 3 Cal. App.2d 401, 39 P.2d 457 (1934).
40 Presnall v. McLeary, 50 S.W. 1066 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
41.Cornell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 P.602 (1914).




the statutory period but merely goes to the enhancement of dam-
ages. 4
3
Even though the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation
by an attorney of his negligence extends the statute of limitations,
most jurisdictions hold that an attorney has no duty to advise his
client of his negligence, nor must he advise the client of a possible
action of malpractice against himself.
4 4
Time of Discovery Rule
Reflecting an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, the Law Revision
Commission of New York in 1962 proposed a statute to revise that
state's rule so that periods of limitations for bringing of malpractice
actions in such cases should not begin to run until the discovery of the
injury, but the statute was not enacted.45
Almost universally, regardless of the factual particulars, clients
contend that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
they have discovered the attorney's negligence. 46 Except where fraud
is involved, the courts have overwhelmingly rejected this view. The
result has been hardship and unfairness to countless clients.
The root of the evil appears to be found in the 1830 case of
Wilcox v. Plummer.47 The case uses the principle that the statute begins
to run when the negligent act of the attorney occurs. It rejected the
client's contention that the statute did not begin to run until some
damage had been incurred by the client, reasoning that the moment
damages were shown to exist, perhaps no more could be had but
nominal recovery. But, on the other hand, the damages caused by
the attorney's negligence could grow, even up to the day of the ver-
dict. Thus the negligence and not the damage is the cause of action.
Although the case discusses the time at which damage is incurred
and not the discovery of the attorney's negligence, in many cases
the client discovers the attorney's negligence when he finds that he
has been damaged. In such cases there is no distinction in point of
time between discovery and damage. Thus, in rejecting the client's
contention of discovery many courts cite Wilcox.4 8 Again, the courts'
rationale for this rule is weak or no rationale is given and just the
rule is stated.
A recent Florida case offers hope that the discovery rule is
gaining favor. Although the attorney in Downing v. Vaine49 did not
43 Seigel v. Kranis, 52 Misc.2d 78, 274 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
44 Fortune v. English, 226 II. 262, 80 N.E. 781 (1907).
45 1962 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. at 231-233, McKinney's 1962 Session Laws
at 3392.
45 Goldberg v. Bosworth, 29 Misc.2d 1057, 215 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Yandell
v. Baker, 65 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Ct. App. 1968).
47 Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Pet. 172, 7 L. Ed. 821 (1830).
4s Budd v. Nixen, 15 Cal. App.3d 157, 92 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1971).
40 Downing v. Vaine, 228 So.2d 622 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. (2)
conceal his negligence, the client did not discover it until more than
three years after the negligence act. The statute of limitations for
legal.malpractice in Florida is three years.
In affirming the trial court's verdict for the client, Judge Wig-
gington wrote:
A careful examination of the decisions which adopt the
general rule (that in the absence of fraudulent concealment
the statute of limitations for the malpractice of an attorney
begins to run at the time of the attorney's negligent act)
fails to disclose the rationale which gives credence to and
justifies the rule. The effect of the rule is to hold that an
injured client must commence the action against his attor-
ney for malpractice within the period of limitations after the
negligent act is committed, even though the client is totally
unaware of the fact that the negligent act giving rise to the
cause of action had occurred. We find it impossible to
rationalize how an injured client can be required to insti-
tute an action within a limited time after his cause of action
accrues if he has no means of knowing by the exercise of
reasonable diligence that the cause of action exists. It occurs
to us that one should be held in fault for failing to timely
exercise a right only if he knows, or by the exercise of reason-
able diligence should have known, that such right existed. It
is our view that the general rule above elucidated casts upon
a client an unfair burden of knowing as much about the intri-
cacies of the law as does the attorney whom he employs to
protect his legal rights. In order to comply with the rule, the
" injured client would have to be sufficiently versed in the
law to know exactly how and on which date his attorney
committed an act of negligence in the prosecution or main-
tenance of the legal matters entrusted to his care in order
that an action against the attorney might be instituted before
being barred by the statute of limitations. We cannot agree
with legal philosophy which adheres to such an unreasonable
principle of law.50
Conclusion
Statutes of limitations are founded on the theory that valid
claims should not be allowed to rest very long. Thus, by preventing
undue delay in the bringing of a suit, the statute operates against
those who neglect their rights. In jurisdictions where the time of
discovery rule is not followed as to attorney malpractice, such statutes
have a harsh effect. An attorney's services, by their nature, affect
his client over a long period of time. The effects of the attorney's
acts often are not fully known for many years. Since the law is such
a sophisticated field, a layman cannot immediately ascertain that his
attorney has been negligent. The effect is that the client's innocent
ignorance protects the attorney from liability for his negligent acts.
In the area of medical malpractice the trend is that the statute
of limitations begins to run from the discovery of the malpractice. 51
50 Id. at 625.
51 Staley v. U.S., 306 F.Supp. 521 (M.D.Pa. 1969).
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Since both the physician-patient and attorney-client relationships are
ones of trust and dependency upon professional judgment, there
should be no distinction between' the two areas. Attorneys who press
malpractice actions against medical practitioners frequently argue
that the ready availability of the malpractice remedy makes doctors
more cautious and certain in their diagnoses and procedures. Can
it not be said with equal conviction that the very attorneys who
make this argument, as well as their brothers in law, would be more
diligent in conducting their clients' affairs were it more difficult for
them to avoid liability?
In this age of professional liability insurance, client security funds,
expanded law curricula, continuing legal education, accessible prac-
tice seminars, and a system that commands flexible justice, the legal
profession suffers loss of respect when courts rule for the wrongdoer
instead of for the duly diligent client., Since the rule of discovery
has been judicially imposed upon the medical profession, is it not
unfair for that same judiciary to demand less vigilance of its own
profession?
The law is one of several professions, and just as the Earth is
not the center of the universe, as Ptolemy contended, the law cannot
make rules favoring its own profession. It is hoped that it will not
take another Copernicus to show that an attorney's profession re-
volves around the bright light of logic. A few attorneys have blazed
the more equitable path in medical malpractice cases. The time is
now at hand for the courts to follow that path in legal malpractice.
The courts should now adopt the rule that the statute of limitations
for professional negligence begins to run when the negligent act is
discovered by the victim.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
